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IN THE SUPREl!E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

i.\L:.'.: OF

UTAH,

Plaintiff/Respondent

JOSE

DeJESUS,

Case No. 19014

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Jose DeJesus, appeals from a conviction
and judgment of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the First Degree,
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge,
presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Jose DeJesus, was charged with Aggravated
a felony of the First Degree, in violation of Title 76,
6. Section 302, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
Apoellant was convicted as charged in a jury trial and was
to incarceration at the Utah State Prison for the
t<·rminate term of not less than five years nor more than
'll'

RELIEf SOUGHT Otl ,\PPE,\L
The appellant seeks to have the convict ion and j·1d
rendered below reversed and to have the case remanded

t»

• 1,

Third Judicial District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts relevant to the issues on appeal are that on
May 2, 1982, at approximately 2:10 p.m.

three men entered

Fankhauser Jewelery Store located at 1111 East 2100 South, Sal"
Lake City, Utah, where the co-owner, Mrs. l1iriam Davis, and he,
daughter, Shauna, were working (T. 15).

The men were described

as being dark-skinned, wearing trench coats with one carrying
shotgun (T. 24) ,

i

They were described as being be tween twenty

twenty-eight years old.

The Appellant was identified at trial

by Mrs. Davis as being the individual carrying the shotgun (T.2·
and forcing her to 1 ie face down behind the back counter (T. 27 ·
Although the Appellant was identified as the person who contlcu
to hold the shotgun on Mrs. Davis,

testimony of a Salt Lake Po;.

Identification Technician was that fingerprints belonging to
Appellant were found on the glass counter of a showcase across
the room from where the Appellant was identified as standing
(T.107-110).

Jewelry valued at some $50,000.00 to $60,000.00

was taken before the men left (T. 33).

-2-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
l'l!I::RE \iAS INSUFFICIEllT EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE STATE TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND A REASONDOUBT AS TO ANY OFFENSE.
The jury found the Appellant guilty of Aggravated Robbery,
a felony of the First Degree.

The evidence presented at trial

was insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty of

Aggravated Robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant asserted

throughout the trial that he was in New York at the time the
robbery occurred and, therefore, could not have participated in
the robbery.
Evidence was presented at trial that Mr. DeJesus was
convicted of burglary, a second degree felony and was placed on
probation by Judge Durham (T.160).

As part of that probation,

an interstate compact transfer was arranged.

On January 22, 1982,

r. DeJe:ous was released from the county jail to go to the State

:1

of

York (T.161).

the

On May 17, 1982, a ticket was issued at

Airport in New York to Mr. DeJesus (T.:69), indicat-

ing that he was still in New York at that time, two weeks after
robbery at issue had taken place.
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442, 444 (1983), this
'J'irt stated,

" . . . notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of

jur:1's decision this Court still has the right to review the
of the evidence to support the verdict."

-3-

Further, the

Court noted:
We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence onlv when
the evidence (viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict) is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed
the crime for which he was convicted.
Id.
(Citations ommitted.)
In State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1980),

the dissent note

If the circumstances essential for
conviction, are ambiguous and consistent with the innocence of the
accused, then this Court must hold
as a matter of law that there is no
usbstantial evidence to support the
guilt of the accused.
This standard restates the Due Process requirements which prohi
a criminal conviction in all cases except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the cr:a"
with which a defepdant is charged.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443

307 (1979);

358 (1970).

In re Winship, 397 U.S.

Viewed against this background, Appellant contends tha'.
there was insufficient evidence presented to place him in
much less in Salt Lake City robbing a jewelry store on :-lay 3.
1982.

No evidence was presented by the State to rebut the

evidence that Mr. DeJesus had purchased an airplane ticket in
New York fully two weeks after the robbery.

Given this evidenc,

the jury could not have found Appellant gui 1 t y beyond a reason&
doubt and the conviction for aggravated robberv cannot stanJ

-4-

POINT II
1:!E COURT ERRED IN FAILitlG TO GIVE A
T_:JSTRUCTIOtl REGARDitlG IDENTIFICATION.
The Appellant requested a separate instruction regarding
ewitness identification.

The issue was raised at trial as to

che descriptions of the robbers given by the victims shortly
after the incident.

Two of the victims, Mariam and Shauna Davis,

independently described the robber as Iranian (T.49 & 77).
Appellant in this case is of Spanish decent.

The

Despite this

rliscrepancy, the trial court refused to give the requested instruction regarding identification.
This Court has articulated the standard for when an
instruction should be given.

In State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211,

1213 (Utah 1980), this Court stated:
A defendant's entitlement to a jury
instruction on his theory of the case
is not absolute.
It is necessarily
conditional upon the existence of a
reasonable basis in the evidence to
justify the giving of the proposed
instruction.
(Citations ommitted).
The Appellant in the instant case claims that he was not the robber,
that he 11as in tlew York at the time of the incident and so the
eyewitnesses identification was mistaken.

Based on the testimony

that he had purchased an airline ticket in New York after the
·ohbery had taken place in Salt Lake City (T.169), there would
to be the necessary evidence to justify the instruction
identification.

-5-

The dangers inherent in eyewitness identific::itL,in "' [,""
have been the subject of discussion for many vears
quoted passage, the late Felix Frankfurter,

Tn an

former Uni tc>d ,, ,

Supreme Court Justice, observed:
What is the worth of identification
testimony even when uncontradicted?
The identification of strangers is
proverbially untrustworthy.
The
hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances
in the records of English and American
trials.
These instances are recent-not due to the brutalities of ancient
criminal procedure.
Evidence as to identity based on
personal impressions, however bona
fide, is perhaps of all classes of
evidence the least to be relied upon,
and therefore, unless supported by
other facts, an unsafe basis for the
verdict of a jury.
Frankfurter, The
Trial of Sacco and Vanzetti.
The unreliability of eyewitness identification has been'
documented in the literature, and numerous law review articles
been written on the subject in recent years.

1

1

The commentators

Did Your E es Deceive You? Ex ert Ps cholo ical
on the Unre ia i ity o Eyewitness I entification,
Stan,
969 (1977); Due Process Standards fo:;: the Admissibilit of Evewitness Identification Evi ence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461
7 ; £'.,,,,
witness Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No,
407 (1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental Studies of Face
Identification, 3 Nat'. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); Use of
Identification Evicl.,"c"' in Criminal Trials, 21 Crim. L,Q, 361 (1
Loftus, Eyewitness Testimon{ (1979); Public Defender Sourcebook
pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed.
976); Yarmey, The Psvchology of
witness Testimony (1979); Buckhout, Determinants of Evewitness
Perf?rmance on a Lineup, 1974 Bull. Psychonomic Soc' y, 191: BJ:
Eyewitness Identification andPsychology in the Courtroom,
_
Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 5-9· Buckhout Evewitness Testimonv, Sc1en
Am., Dec. 1974, at 23; Levine &
The Ps·1chulo•,"' ot Cr_imi.r
-6-

1
:

:

it

reasons for this unreliability are found in the problems
.i:;sociated with human perception and memory, both of
a vital role in eyewitness identification.

A lengthy

of those problems are found in a law review article
with the problems of perception and memory which are
associated with hearsay testimony.2

With respect to those issues,

the author noted:
At a basic level, perception is
determined by objective structural
factors such as the nature of the
stimulus, the impact of the stimulus
on the sense organs according to
various physical laws; the operation
of the afferent neural pathways from
the sense organs to the brain, and
the cortical projection or reconstruction of the stimulus. However, the
neurological system operates to transduce physical energy into a sensation,
it is clear that interpretation is
required to transform sensation into
meaning.
In organizing raw sensory input, the
central nervous system is not a photographic recorder. . .
Injury, pathology,
drugs, youth, and senility can seriously
impair the accuracy of these processes.
1970 Utah Law Rev. at 9.
1

(continued)
Identification: The Ga from Wade to Kirb ,
U. Pa. L.Rev. 1079 (1973 ; Luce, The Neglected Dimension in
E 1ewitness Identification, Crim. Def., May-June 1977 at 5-8;
Tnrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness Credibilitf
the Sights
of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law. 563, 575-85 1976 .
1

Stewart, Perception, Memort and Hearsay: A Criticisim of
Pn"sPnt La\v and the Proposed Feder a Rules of Evidence, 1970 Utah
I i.\1

l"{0V .

I.

-7-

In United States v.

Barber, 4l:'

c

2J SU

(3rd Cir

the court gave a similar description of the processes in,}():_
in human observation, perception and memor:.'

It then

','L'J1,

to state, with respect to eyewitness identification
Eyewitness identification testimony,
therefore, is an expression of a
belief or impression by the witness.
If there is a high degree of precision
and certainty in his expression, which
is consistent with any prior statements
and unshaken on cross-examination, the
statement of the witness may be regarded
as a statement of fact.
If certainty
is lacking, the expression is deemed to
possess an evidentiary quality of inferior
rank.
Thus, where the circumstances
surrounding the criminal act gave limited
opportunity for observation or utilization
of the sensory perception, or where, uncertainty is expressed by the witness
himself, or exposed by a past history of
the witness's statements or demonstrated
by cross-examination, the statement of
identity should be considered as only an
expression of opinion and should be
accompanied by appropriate instructions
as to its sufficiency and weight.
To be
sure, the courts have been generous in
the admission of eyewitness identification
in order to permit the jury to make its
own assessment.
The emphasis has been on
inclusion of evidence, rather than exclusion,
on credibility, rather than admissibility.
(Footnotes omitted.)
412 F.2d at 527.
In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.

377 (1968),

United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
photographic array was impermissibily suggestive

in violation

of the petitioner's right to Due Process of Law.

In doing so,

the court discussed the dangers associated with the use of
photographic identifications, stating:
-8-

It must be recognized that improper
employment of photographs by police
mav sometimes cause witnesses to err
in. identifying criminals.
A witness
may have obtained only a brief glimpse
of a criminal, or may have seen him
under poor conditions.
Even if the
police subsequently follow the most
correct photographic identification
procedures and show him the pictures
of a number of individuals without
indicating whom they suspect, there
is some danger that the witness may
make an incorrect identification.
This danger will be increased if the
police display to the witness only
the picture of a single indivdual
who generally resembles the person he
saw, or if they show him the pictures
of several persons among which the
photograph of a single such individual
recurs or is in some way emphasized.
(Footnote omitted.)
390 U.S. at 383.
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in State v. Warren, 635 P.2d

1263 (Kan.

1981), discussed those general problems at length

are associated with the use of eyewitness identification
e'Ji dence.

The court then took note of the particular prol;>lems

arise in the courtroom with that evidence:
In spite of the great volume of articles
on the subject of eyewitness testimony
by legal writers and the great deal of
scientific research by psychologists in
recent years, the courts in this country
have been slow to take the problem
seriously and, until recently, have not
taken effective steps to confront it.
ThE trouble is that many judges have
assumed that an "eveball" witness, who
identifies the accused as the criminal,
is the most reliable of witnesses,and
if there are any questions about the
identification, the jurors, in their
wisdom, are fully capable of determining
the credibility of the witness without
special instructions from the court.

-9-

Yet cases of mistaken identification
are not infrequent and the
of
misidentification has not been
alleviated.
We note, for example, a 1979 unrep•1rteJ
prosecution in Wilmington, Delaware,
against Rev. Bernard T. Pagano, a
Roman Catholic priest, accused of robbing
six Delaware stores in the winter of
1978. At the trial, he was falselv
identified by several state
as the robber.
After the State rested
its case, the prosecution was dismissed
on motion of the State because another
man confessed to the crime.
Closer to
home is the case of Ronald Quick, who
was twice tried and convicted of aggravated
robbery of a liquor store in Hutchinson.
At both trials two eyewitnesses positively
identified defendant as the perpetrator of
the crime.
These two convictions were
reversed for trial errors in State v.
Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979)
ancr2'"2 9 Kan . 11 7 , 6 21 P . 2 d 9 9 7 (19 81 ) .
The case was dismissed by the State during
the third trial after another man, who
looked like the defendant, confessed to
the crime.
The Kansas procedure does provide certain
safeguards to prevent the conviction of
an innocent accused on the basis of unreliable eyewitness identification.
Our
trial courts have the power to suppress
eyewitness testimony, if the eyewitness
identification procedure rendered the
testimony unreliable.
Cross-examination
and argument by defense counsel afford
some protection.
Unfortunately, these
procedures have not solved the problem.
Able defense counsel have attempted to
combat unreliable eyewitness identification by two additional methods: They
have called to the witness stand expert
witnesses in the field of psychology to
testify as to the various factors which
may cause eyewitness identificaiton to he
unreliable.
They have also requested Lhe
trial court to give a cautionary instruction stating the factors to be considered
-10-

bv the jury in weighing the credibility
of eyewitness testimony.
635 P.2d at
1241.
cdse,

1

the trial court refused to allow the defense to

her of these actions.

Elizabeth Loftus, an expert on

ew1tness identification, was not allowed to testify and the
·01irt

refused to give the same instruction as appellant requested

in this case.

After a lengthy discussion on the use of expert

restimonv to solve the problems associated with the eyewitness
restimony,

the Kansas court stated:
After considering these cases and the
literature on the subject, we have
concluded that requiring trial courts
to admit this type of expert evidence
is not the answer to the problem.
We
believe that the problem can be alleviated by a proper cautionary instruction
to the jury which sets forth the factors
to be considered in evaluating eyewitness
testimony.
Such an instruction, coupled
with vigorous cross-examination and
persuasive argument by defense counsel
dealing realistically with the shortcomings and trouble spots of the
identification process, should protect
the rights of the defendant and at the
same time enable the courts to avoid
the problems involved in the admission
of expert testimony on this subject.
635 P.2d at 1243.

The instruction that the Kansas court held should be
,iven was that framed by the United States Court of Appeals for
:lie District of Columbia in United States v.

'3" (D.C.

Cir. 1972).3

Telfaire, 469 F.2d

The Telfaire court described the need

--j

This same instruction was cited with approval by Justice

rcwdrt in his dissenting opinion in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56
11 0J (Utah 1982), and as requested by appellant in this case.

-11-

for such an instruction, stating:
The presumption of innocence that Sdfeguards the common law system must be d
premise that is realized in instruction
and not merely a promise.
In pursuance
of that objective, we have pointed out
the importance of and need for a special
instruction on the key issue of identification, which emphasized to the jury the
need for finding that the cirumstances
of the identification are convincing
beyond a reasonable doubt.
This need
was voiced in 1942 in McKenzie v. United
States, [126 F.2d 533] and it has been
given vitality in our opinions of recent
years--following the Supreme Court's 1966
Wade-Gilbert [v. California, 388 U.S. 263
87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1178 (1967)]
Stovall [v. Denno, 383 U.S. 293] trilogy
focusing on the very real danger of mistaken identidication as a threat to
justice. We refer to our post-Wade
opinions in Gregory [v. United states,
369 F.2d 185 (1966)]
and Macklin [v.
United States, 409 F.2d 174 (1969))
These opinions sought to take into
account the traditional recognition
that identification testimony presents
speical problems of reliability by
stressing the importance of an identification instruction even in case meeting
the constitutional threshold of admissibility.
[Footnotes ommitted.]
469 F.2d
at 555.
In State v. Warren, supra, the court held that the moJe:
instruction from the Telfaire case was more appropriate than a

-12-

i- ,

I

t

n" true t ion dea 1 ing with an identification defense. 4
. we have considered the fact that
trial courts are often required to
determine the admissibility of eyewitness
testimony where issues of unreliability
are raised.
As pointed out by Chief
Justice Schroeder in State v. Ponds, 227
Kan. 627, 608 P.2d 946, in testing the
reliability of identification testimony,
the five factors mentioned in Neil v.
Biggers, [ 490 U.S. 188 (1972)] should be
considered by the trial court.
If these
five factors should be considered in
determining the admissiblity of the
testimony, it would seem even more appropriate to require the jury to consider

The general instruction given in that case provided:
INSTRUCTION NO.
"It is for you to determine the weight and credit to be
given the testimony of each witness.
You have a right to use that
knowledge and experience which you possess in common with men in
general in considering the testimony of each witness.
You also
may take the following factors into consideration when weighing
a witness' testimony:
(a) The witness' ability and opportunity to observe
and know the things about which he had testified;
(b)

The clarity and accuracy of the witness' memory;

(c)

The witness' manner and conduct while testifying;

(d)

Any interest the witness may have in the result of

che trial; and

(e) The reasonableness of the witness' testimony when
considered in light of all the evidence in the case; and
'!lil"

(f)
have.

Any bias, interest, prejudice or motive the witness

If you find that any witness has willfully testified falsely
anv material matter, you have a right to distrust the
.1 irnunv of
witness in other matters, and you may reject all or
.1rt of
testimonv of that witness, you you may give it such
i.;ht as ·1ou think it deserves.
You should not reject any testimony
lti1out
635 P.2d at 1245.
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the same factors in weighing the
credibility of the eyewitness identification testimony.
Otherwise the
might reasonably conclude that the
admission of the evidence by the trial
court vouched for its reliability.
We
think it clear that, in order to prevent
potential injustice, some standards must
be provided the jury so that the credibility of eyewitness identification testimony
can be intelligently and fairly weighed.
The giving of such an instruction will
take only a couple of minutes in trial
time and will be well worth it, if some
future injustices can be avoided.
635
P.2d at 1244.
[Emphasis by court.]
In Neil v. Biggers, supra, the United States Supreme Cour:
was addressing the issue of the admissiblity of eyewitness ident'.:
cation evidence based on a showup procedure. 5

In determining the

admissibility of the evidence the court initially noted that you
must consider the totality of the circumstances.

The court then

listed several factors to consider, stating:
As indicated by our cases, the factors
to be considered in evaluating the
likelihood of misidentification include
the opportunity of the witness to view
the criminal at the time of the crime,
the witness' degree of attention, the
accuracy of the witness' prior description
of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time
between the crime and the confrontation.
409 U.S. at 199.

5

That procedure involved two detectives walking the
petitioner past a rape victim.
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Fur these same reasons a number of other jurisdictions
,_nmd that the model instruction from United States v.

- ,ire.

supra, should be given when warranted by the circumstances
case.6

0

In Utah,

the Telfaire instruction was cited with approval

Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v. Malmrose,
649 P. 2d 56 (Utah 1982).

In that case the majority opinion did

not squarely address the issue of the requirement of such an
instruction.

The court did not find reversible error in the

trial court's refusal to give the instruction.

The primary

reason the court gave for that holding was that defense counsel
failed to take exception to the trial court's refusal to give that
instruction.

The c,ourt then stated, "We have not heretofore held

that such an instruction is required.

We believe the giving of it

should be left to the discretion of the trial court," 649 P.2d at

The Telfaire instruction specifically has either recommend-

ed or approved for use in numerous jurisdictions as reflected by

the following cases:
United States v. Holly, 502 F.2c 273 (4th Cir.
1974);
United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir.1975); State
''· Benjamin, 363 A.2d 762 (Conn. 1976); State v. Calia, 514 P.zcr-1354 (Or. App. 1973), cert. den. 417 U.S. 917 (1974); Commonwealth
·1. Rodriguez,
391 N.E. 2d 889 (Mass. 1979); United States v.
Kavanau2h, 572 F. 2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Dodge,
538 F. 2 770 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. den., 429 U.S. 1099 (1977);
United States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.) cert. den., 426
".S. 908 (1976); United States v. O'Neal,
F.2d 368 (6th Cir.
lg74); United States v. Fernandez, 456 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1972);
v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d 269, 421 N.E. 2d 157 (1981); State
" Pa·me, 230 S.E. 2d 72 (W. Va. 1981); United States v. Cueto,
1273 (10th Cir. 1980); People v. Guzman, 121 Cal. Rptr.
' 1
!.+7 Cal. App. 3d 380 (Cal. App. 1975); State v. Motes, 215 S.E.
J l'JO (S.C. 1075); State v. Pazue, 280 S.E. 2d 72 (W.Va. 1981);
v.
649 P. 2d 56 Utah 1982) (Stewart, J. dissent-
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61.

Justice Stewart wrote a dissent to that part of the coun,

opinion and Justice Durham concurred in that dissent.
Previously, this court had decided that it

not

reversible error to give an instruction similar to that given
in State v. Warren, supra, State v. Schaffer, 683 P.2d 1185
1981).

(lcr

It is interesting to note that State v. Schaffer, supra,

was not even cited in the Malmrose case.

In Schaffer, the couc

did not say there was no error in refusing to give the ins tructioc
but rather, the court reasoned that because other general
tions on credibility and burden of proof were given,
adequately advised on what the law was.

the jury ''a'

Secondly, the court

noted that there were two eyewitnesses who had abundant opportur;;
to observe the defendant, thus alleviating any prejudice.

The

court concluded that the refusal to give the instruction did not
constitute "reversible error" [emphasis added].

638 P. 2d at

nr

Similarly in State v. Mccumber, 622 P. 2d 353 (Utah 1980)
the issue of the refusal to given an instruction on eyewitness
identification was raised. 7

With respect to that issue this

court stated:
A criminal defendant is entitled to
have ajury instructed on his theory
of the case if there is any substantial
evidence to justify such an instruction.
Where, however, the requested instruction
is denied, no prejudicial error occurs
if it appears that the giving of the
requested instruction would not have
affected the outcome of the trial.
Moreover, a defendant is not entitled
to an instruction which is redundant
7

The test of the instruction was not included in the or:
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or repetitive of principles enunciated
in other instructions given to the
jury.
The principal points of defendant's proposed instruction dealt with
the State's burden of proof and the
factors to consider in weighing the
testimony of an eyewitness. All of
these factors were adequately dealt
with in other instructions presented
to the jury by the trial court.
As a
result, we cannot agree that the denial
of the proposed instruction constituted
reversible error.
[Footnote ommitted.]
622 P.2d at 359.
The general conclusions that can be reached about these
cases are:

First of all, this court has never said that such

an instruction is improper and should not be given.

Secondly,

the court has clearly implied that under certain circumstances
the identity instruction would be proper.

Finally, the court

in all of these cases, spoke in terms of no reversible error
indicating that due to the nature of the cases, even though there

may have been error, there was no prejudice to the appellants.
Several other principles of Utah law which were dealt
with only in passing or not mentioned at all in those cases, must
be discussed here.

Under the law of Utah a criminal defendant

is entitled of have his theory of the case presented to the jury
in the form of written instructions, State v. Stenbeck, 78 U.S.
350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931), State v. McCumber, supra.
to defenses,

With respect

a criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury

that the defense need only raise a reasonable doubt.
t_Ji_P v.

'I 694

Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977); State v. Torres, 619
(Utah 1980); and State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981).
-17-

The mere fact that the court gave general instrucrions on r!,,
presumption of innocence and burden of proof does not

c1

l le:

·Lie

the prejudice in refusing to instruct the jury with
the defendant's burden in establishing his defense.

t

This cour·

has held that a jury need not
. . . go through such a tortuous process
when that result could have been achieved
by giving the defendant's requested instruction, or one of that substance. State v.
Torres, supra, at 696.
In this case there was no instruction given which explai:.'
to the jury what the defense was, nor was there any instruction
given which explained to the jury what the burden of proof was
with respect to a defense.

Consequently, it was error not to

give an instruction explaining to the jury what the defense was.
and relating that portion of the evidence to the reasonable doubc
standard.

The polictes above, are substantial and compelling.

That instruction is clearly a necessary and proper one and it ;m
error to refuse to give it to the jury.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant maintained that he could not have been t'ie
perpetrator of the robbery as he was in new York at the time tr.e
robbery occurred.

The only testimony that refuted this was the

identification of the Appellant by the victims.

Despite the

accepted problems inherent in eyewitness identificaiton, the
court failed to give a separate instruction regarding eyewitnes·
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1

'"

i ! i 1'ation and the problems with such identification.

Because

'.umulative error of insufficient evidence to maintain
1nviction based on the alibi defense and the failure to
the eyewitness identification instruction, the trial court
,:ummi t ted reversible error and this conviction cannot stand.
Respectfully submitted this

Attorney for Appellant
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